No-signaling proofs, motivated by quantum computation, have found applications in cryptography and hardness of approximation. An important open problem is characterizing the power of no-signaling proofs. It is known that 2-prover no-signaling proofs are characterized by PSPACE, and that no-signaling proofs with poly(n)-provers are characterized by EXP. However, the power of k-prover no-signaling proofs, for 2 < k < poly(n) remained an open problem.
Introduction
Proofs lie at the heart of the theory of computation. The concept of proofs began to evolve in the mid-eighties, starting with the seminal work on interactive proofs by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [10] , which introduced the idea of using randomness and interaction in proofs. Interactive proofs (IP) were introduced for the purpose of constructing zero-knowledge proofs, though were realized to be quite powerful, in Shamir's celebrated IP = PSPACE Theorem [23, 28] .
Shortly after interactive proofs were introduced, multi-party interactive proofs were introduced by Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson [3] . In a multi-prover interactive proof (MIP) a verifier is interacting with several non-communicating provers. This class was proven to be extremely powerful, by Babai, Fortnow and Lund, who showed that MIP = NEXP [1] . The power of this class stems from the assumption that the provers behave locally, namely, they see only the messages sent to them, and do not have any information about messages sent to the other provers. all the coefficients are non-negative (which is the regime where hardness of approximation is most meaningful). More specifically, they showed that there exists a fixed polytope (corresponding to the set of all possible non-signaling strategies) such that approximating the value of a linear program (with positive coefficients) is P-complete with a polylog-space reduction. Prior work [8, 27, 9, 22] , demonstrated such hardness of approximation for the case where the polytope was not fixed (and preprocessing is not allowed). The importance of the notion of no-signaling, gives rise to the following fundamental question:
What is the power of multi-prover proofs that are sound against no-signaling strategies?
This is precisely the question we study in this work. In what follows, we denote the class of one-round multi-prover interactive proofs with no-signaling soundness by NS MIP. We denote by k-prover NS MIP the class of one-round k-prover interactive proofs with no-signaling soundness.
Prior Work
Ito, Kobayashi and Matsumoto [15] proved that 2-prover NS MIP contains PSPACE (by proving that the 2-prover scheme of Cai, Condon, and Lipton [6] is in fact secure against no-signaling strategies). Shortly after, Ito [13] proved that 2-prover NS MIP is contained in PSPACE, thus characterizing the power of 2-prover NS MIP. The power of k-prover NS MIP, for k ≥ 2, remained open.
It is known that NS MIP is contained in EXP since one can find the best no-signaling strategy by solving an exponential-size linear program. Therefore, the power of a k-prover NS MIP lies between PSPACE and EXP. More recently, Kalai, Raz and Rothblum [19] showed that there exists a constant c ∈ N such that for every k ≥ n c , k-prover NS MIP contains EXP, thus characterizing the power of k-prover NS MIP for k ≥ n c .
These works left open the following question: What is the power of k-prover NS MIP for 2 < k < n c ?
Our Results
Throughout this manuscript, we assume that an MIP has completeness at least 1 − negl(n), and has soundness negl(n), for some negligible function negl(n). 2 This assumption is standard in cryptography. We mention that often in the definition of interactive proofs (or possibly in the definition of MIPs), completeness is required to be greater than 2/3 and soundness at most 1/3; this is because it is well known that this gap can be amplified to 1 − negl(n) and negl(n) via parallel repetition (where the verifier accepts if 2/3 − ǫ of the repetitions are accepted, for some small constant ǫ > 0). In the no-signaling regime we do not have a parallel repetition theorem [12] , and hence cannot amplify soundness via parallel repetition.
We prove that k-prover NS MIP with k = O( √ log n) is contained in PSPACE. More generally, we prove the following theorem. Theorem 1.1 (Informal). There exist constants c, d > 0 such that any k-prover MIP with nosignaling soundness at most 2 −ck 2 and completeness at least 1−2 −dk 2 , is contained in SPACE poly(n, 2 k 2 ) .
We emphasize that this theorem holds only for MIPs that have negligible soundness and almost perfect completeness. In particular, we don't rule out the existence of a k-prover MIP with NS soundness 1/3 and completeness 2/3 for EXP, with k = log n. However, the soundness and completeness gap of such MIPs could not be amplified (to 1 − negl(n)) without adding provers.
We present two alternative routes for proving Theorem 1.1, each is of independent interest. Both routes consider the more relaxed notion of sub-no-signaling, as defined in [21] (for the goal of obtaining a parallel repetition theorem for no-signaling strategies). Both rely on the following theorem that asserts that one can convert any sub-no-signaling strategy into a no-signaling one, albeit with a substantial loss in the success probability. Theorem 1.2 (Informal). There exist constants c, d > 0 such that for any k-prover MIP, if there exists a sub-no-signaling strategy that succeeds with probability at least 1 − 2 −dk 2 , then there exists a no-signaling strategy that succeeds with probability at least 2 −ck 2 .
The proof of this theorem contains the bulk of technical difficulty of this work, and is used as a building block in both proofs of Theorem 1.1. See Section 2.3 for the proof idea, and see Section 5 for the precise theorem statement and proof.
We note that a related theorem was proven by Lancien and Winter [21] , who showed that, for every game, if there exists a sub-no-signaling strategy that succeeds with probability at least 1 − ǫ then there exists a no-signaling strategy that succeeds with probability at least 1 − Γǫ, where Γ may be as large as exponential in the communication complexity. This bound does not seem to be tight enough in order to obtain Theorem 1.1.
We next present our two alternative routes for proving Theorem 1.1 (using Theorem 1.2). The first is via a prover reduction method, and the second is via approximating the sub-no-signaling value efficiently.
Reducing the number of provers. We show that (a slight variant of) the classical prover reduction method for converting a k-prover MIP into a 2-prover MIP, carries over to the nosignaling setting, albeit a substantial loss in soundness (which depends on k).
More specifically, in the seminal work of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson [3] , they presented a general method for converting a k-prover MIP into a 2-prover MIP, where in the resulting 2-prover MIP the verifier sends one prover the queries (q 1 , . . . , q k ) corresponding to all the k provers in the underlying k-prover scheme, and expects to get back k answers (a 1 , . . . , a k ); he sends the other prover a single query q i corresponding to a random index i ∈ [k], and gets back an answer a ′ i . The verifier accepts if and only if a ′ i = a i and if the verifier in the k-prover MIP accepts the answers (a 1 , . . . , a k ).
In the no-signaling setting, we slightly modify this transformation, by having the verifier in the 2-prover MIP send the second prover a subset of queries {q i } i∈S for a randomly chosen subset S ⊂ [k] (as opposed to a single query q i corresponding to a single index i ∈ [k]), and accepts if and only if the answers (a 1 , . . . , a k ) of the first prover are accepted by the verifier in the k-prover MIP and if the answers of the second prover, denote by (a ′ i ) i∈S satisfy that a ′ i = a i for every i ∈ S. Theorem 1.3 (Informal). There exist constants c, d > 0 such that for every k-prover MIP Π = (P 1 , . . . , P k , V ) with no-signaling soundness at most 2 −ck 2 , the 2-prover MIP, obtained by performing the prover reduction transformation (described above) on Π, has no-signaling soundness at most 1 − 2 −dk 2 .
We prove Theorem 1.3 by using Theorem 1.2. We refer the reader to Section 2.1 for the proof idea, and Section 4.1 for the precise theorem statement and proof.
We next argue that Theorem 1.3 implies Theorem 1.1. Let c, d be the constants from Theorem 1.3. We prove Theorem 1.1 with constants c ′ = c and d ′ = 2d. To this end, fix any k-prover MIP for a language L with no signaling soundness 2 −ck 2 and completeness 1 − 2 −2dk 2 . Use Theorem 1.3 to convert this MIP into a 2-prover MIP with no-signaling soundness 1 − 2 −dk 2 . By [13] , the no-signaling value of any 2-player game can be approximated up to an additive factor of ǫ in space poly(n, 1/ǫ). Setting ǫ = 2 −2dk 2 , there exists an algorithm A that runs in space poly(n, 2 k 2 ), such that on input an element x ∈ {0, 1} n ∩ L it outputs a value v ≥ 1 − 2 · 2 −2dk 2 , and on input an element x ∈ {0, 1} n \ L it outputs a value v ≤ 1 − 2 −dk 2 + 2 −2dk 2 . This algorithm can be used to decide whether x ∈ L (assuming without loss of generality that d > 2 k 2 ), implying that L ∈ SPACE(poly(n, 2 k 2 )).
Approximating the sub-no-signaling value. We next present an alternative route for proving Theorem 1.1, without going through the prover reduction method presented above. Instead we prove the following theorem, which is of independent interest. Theorem 1.4 (Informal). The sub-no-signaling value of any k-prover MIP can be approximated up to an additive factor ǫ by a poly(n, 2 k , 1/ǫ)-space algorithm.
In particular this theorem implies the following corollary.
See Section 2.2 for the proof idea, and see Section 4.2 for the precise theorem statements and proofs.
We mention that a related (yet weaker) theorem was proven in [11] , where it was shown that given an MIP, one can distinguish between the case that its value is 1 (i.e., there exists a local strategy that is accepted with probability 1) and the case that its sub-no-signaling value is at most 1 − δ, in space poly(n, 2 k , 1/δ). This does not seem to be strong enough for us to use in order to obtain Theorem 1.1.
We next argue that Theorem 1.4 and Theorem 1.2 imply Theorem 1.1. To this end, let c, d > 0 be the constants from Theorem 1.2. We prove Theorem 1.1 with any constants c ′ , d ′ such that c ′ > c and d ′ = 2d. Fix any k-prover MIP with soundness at most 2 −c ′ k 2 < 2 −ck 2 and completeness at least 1 − 2 2dk 2 . By Theorem 1.2 for every x ∈ {0, 1} n \ L the sub-no-signaling value the MIP on input x must be less than 1 − 2 −dk 2 . By Theorem 1.4, applied with ǫ = 2 −2dk 2 , there exists an algorithm A, that given any x ∈ {0, 1} n , runs in space poly(n, 2 k 2 ) and approximates the sub-no-signaling value of this MIP on input x up to an additive factor 2 −2dk 2 . Therefore for every x ∈ {0, 1} n \ L, the algorithm A(x) outputs an element v ≤ 1 − 2 −dk 2 + 2 −2dk 2 , and for every x ∈ {0, 1} n ∩ L the algorithm A(x) outputs an element v ≥ 1− 2·2 −2dk 2 . This algorithm can be used to decide whether x ∈ L (assuming without loss of generality that d > 2 k 2 ), implying that L ∈ SPACE(poly(n, 2 k 2 )).
Our Techniques
In this section, we first outline the high level overview of the proofs of Theorem 1.3 and Theorem 1.4 (the former uses Theorem 1.2 as a building block). We then present the high level overview of the proof of Theorem 1.2, which contains the bulk of technical difficulty of this work.
Overview of Theorem 1.3
The main ingredient in the proof of Theorem 1.3, is a claim showing that any no-signaling strategy for the 2-prover MIP that succeeds in convincing the verifier to accept with probability 1 − ǫ can be converted into a sub-no-signaling strategy for the k-pover MIP that succeeds with probability 1 − 2 k ǫ. This claim, together with Theorem 1.2, imply Theorem 1.3 in a relatively straightforward manner.
We next provide the high-level overview of the proof of this claim. Given a no-signaling strategy for the 2-prover MIP we construct a sub-no-signaling strategy for the k-party MIP as follows: Given q = (q 1 , . . . , q k ), run the no-signaling strategy for the 2-prover MIP 2 k times. Namely, for every subset S ⊆ [k], run the no-signaling prover for the 2-prover MIP, while giving the first prover all the queries q = (q 1 , . . . , q k ) and giving the second prover the subset (q i ) i∈S . If the verifier accepts the resulting answers in all the 2 k executions then output the answers given by the first prover in a random execution among these 2 k executions. Otherwise, if even one of these proofs is rejected then output ⊥.
One can easily argue that this strategy is accepted with probability 1 − 2 k ǫ (by a straightforward application of the union bound). Moreover, we argue that this strategy is sub-no-signaling. Intuitively, this follows from the fact that if all of the 2 k executions (of the 2-prover MIP) were accepting, then for every subset S, the distribution of the answers (a i ) i∈S is the same as the distribution provided by the second prover in the 2-prover MIP on input (q i ) i∈S , which is no-signaling. We refer the reader to Section 4.1 for the formal proof.
Overview of the proof of Theorem 1.4
The proof of this theorem follows the approach of [13] , who proved that the no-signaling value of any 2-prover MIP can be approximated in PSPACE. Specifically, we define a linear program corresponding to the k-prover MIP such that the value of the linear program is equal to the sub-nosignaling value of the MIP. We then show that this linear program is of a specific form that allows it to be approximated in PSPACE. Specifically, we show that this linear program can be converted into a mixed packing and covering problem, and use the result of Young [29] which shows that such problems can be approximated via a space-efficient algorithm. We refer the reader to Section 4.2 for the precise theorems and proofs.
Overview of the proof of Theorem 1.2
To prove Theorem 1.2, we need to show how to convert any sub-no-signaling strategy for a kprover MIP that succeeds with probability 1 − 2 −dk 2 into a no-signaling strategy that succeeds with probability 2 −ck 2 (for some constants c, d > 0). As mentioned above, this proof is quite involved and contains the bulk of technical difficulty of this work.
Fix any k-prover MIP (P 1 , . . . , P k , V ). Let us start by introducing some notations and definitions. In what follows, we let q = (q 1 , . . . , q k ) denote a vector of queries that V may send to the k provers, and denote by Q the set of all such possible k-tuples of queries. Similarly, we let a = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) denote a vector of responses sent by the k provers, and denote by A the set of all possible such k-tuples of responses. For every subset S ⊆ [k], and every q ∈ Q and a ∈ A, we denote by q S = (q i ) i∈S and a S = (a i ) i∈S . We define Q S and A S analogously.
Recall that a no-signaling strategy allows the (cheating) provers to collude, and thus each answer can be a function of all the queries. The only restriction is that for any subset S ⊆ [k] of provers, the answers provided by the provers {P i } i∈S should not convey any information about the queries given to the provers {P i } i∈[k]\S . Formally, a no-signaling strategy is defined by a set of distributions {p q } q∈Q , where p q is the distribution of answers of the no-signaling provers upon receiving the query q = (q 1 , . . . , q k ), such that for every set S ⊆ [k] and every q, q ′ ∈ Q such that q S = q ′ S it holds that for every a S ∈ A S 
where as above, Pr[p q = a S ] a * :a * S =a S Pr[p q = a * ]. Note that sub-no-signaling strategies are less constrained than no-signaling ones. We next show how to convert a sub-no-signaling strategy that succeeds in convincing V to accept (x / ∈ L) with probability 1 − 2 −dk 2 into a no-signaling strategy that succeeds in convincing V to accept (x / ∈ L) with probability 2 −ck 2 (for some constants c, d > 0). 4 Fix any such sub-no-signaling strategy {p q } q∈Q together with a corresponding set of distribu-
Step 1. We first reduce the probability of the "outliers" of p q . Namely, if there exists a vector q ∈ Q, a subset S ⊂ [k], and answers a S such that Pr[p q | S = a| S ] is higher than the average probability over all q * 's such that q * S = q S , then we lower Pr[p q | S = a| S ] towards the average. Namely, we construct a family of distributions {p q } q∈Q such that for every q ∈ Q, every S ⊆ [k], and every a S ∈ A S ,
We note that ideally we would have liked to construct {p q } q∈Q that satisfies the above equation where the inequality is replaced with equality, since then {p q } q∈Q would be no-signaling, and we would be done. However, this is possible only if {p q } was no-signaling to begin with. Therefore, we start with the more humble goal of omitting the "outliers". Jumping ahead, this will allow us (in Step 3a below) to construct a family of sub-distributions {Sim (1) S,q S } such that such that for every S, T ⊆ [k] for which S ⊆ T , and for every q ∈ Q and a S ∈ A S ,
Then we will show how to convert this inequality to equality, and finally to a distribution (as opposed to a sub-distribution), which will result with a family of no-signaling distributions.
We construct {p q } in a greedy manner, by starting with {p q } and then lowering the probabilities (in a greedy manner) so that the inequality above is satisfied. Note that in the process we lower the total probability ofp q (it outputs ⊥ in the remaining probability). However, we argue that the fact that {p q } is sub-no-signaling implies that the total probability is not reduced by too much. More specifically, we show that for every q ∈ Q, if Pr a←pq [V (q, a)] = 1−δ (for some δ > 0), then Pr
We thus focus only on queries q ∈ Q for which p q convinces V to accept with probability close to 1, as follows.
In what follows, we focus only on queries q ∈ Q such that
and we denote the set of all such queries by GOOD. By a standard averaging argument we show that
From now on we focus only on q ∈ GOOD. Namely, we consider the modified game where the queries are restricted to being in GOOD. Formally, we modify the MIP and consider a verifier V * that samples q as V , subject to the restriction that q ∈ GOOD, and V * accepts if and only if V accepts. From now on we focus on the MIP (P 1 , . . . , P k , V * ), and we construct a nosignaling strategy only for q ∈ GOOD; i.e., only for queries in the support of the distribution of queries generated by V * . Such a no-signaling strategy that is defined only for queries in the support,is called honest referee no-signaling and was introduced in a recent work by Holmgren and Yang [12] in the context of parallel repetition for no-signaling strategies. Moreover, they showed that if there exists an honest-referee no-signaling strategy that succeeds with probability δ then there exists a no-signaling strategy that succeeds with probability 2 −O(k 2 ) ·δ. Thus, it suffices to construct an honest-referee no-signaling strategy for (P 1 , . . . , P k , V * ).
3.
Step 3. We construct the honest-referee no-signaling strategy via the following steps.
(a)
Step 3(a) We first construct a family of sub-distributions {Sim (1) S,q S } such that for every S, T ⊆ [k] for which S ⊆ T , and for every q ∈ Q and a S ∈ A S ,
and for every q ∈ GOOD
We later convert {Sim (1) S,q S } into a no-signaling distribution by converting Equation (3) to an equality (as opposed to an inequality), and converting each Sim (1) S,q S to be a distribution (as opposed to a sub-distribution). This is achieved in Steps 3b and 3c below.
In what follows we explain our construction of {Sim (1) S,q S }. Our initial idea is to define Sim (1) S,q S as follows: For every a S ∈ A S , define:
Note that this is a sub-distribution since
where the first inequality follows from the fact that by definition of {p q } ( Step 1), and the second is by the definition of sub-no-signaling (Equation (1)).
At first, it may seem that {Sim (1) S,q S } satisfies Equation (3), since on the right-hand-side of Equation (3) we maximize over a larger set of queries than we do on the left-hand-side. However, this is not necessarily the case, since on the left-hand-side of Equation (3) we sum over all a T that are consistent with a S , and for each one we take the best query q that is consistent with q T , whereas on the right-hand-side we take a single best q (that is consistent with q S ) for a S .
To ensure that Equation (3) is satisfied, we update the definition of {Sim (1) S,q S } in a greedy manner, by induction, as follows. For sets S of size 1 and for every q S ∈ Q S , we keep the definition of Sim (1) S,q S as is. Suppose we defined Sim (1) S,q S for all sets S of size less than i, then for any set T of size i and any q T ∈ Q T , update Sim (1) T,q T as follows: If there exists S T and a set a S ∈ A S , such that
then reduce the probability of Sim (1) T,q T so that
This process ensures that indeed Equation (3) is satisfied. However, it reduces the total probability of Sim (1) [k],q , and we need to argue that it does not reduce the probability by too much so that Equation (4) holds. Indeed, we prove that for every q ∈ GOOD,
S,q S } was a family of distributions (as opposed to subdistributions) then this family would be no-signaling. Therefore, our goal is to convert this family to a family of distributions while maintaining the sub-no-signaling property.
To this end, we first convert {Sim (1) S,q S } into a new family of sub-distributions {Sim (2) S,q S } that still satisfies Equation (3), but in addition satisfies that for every ℓ ∈ [k] there exists a value α ℓ ≥ 2 −O(k 2 ) such that for every S ⊂ [k] of size ℓ, and every q S ∈ Q S ,
and that for every q ∈ GOOD,
This is done by simply normalizing each Sim (1) S,q S accordingly. We note that this normalization reduces the success probability. Nevertheless, Equation (5) is crucial, since it will later allow us to convert the sub-distribution into a distribution while maintaining the no-signaling guarantee.
(c)
Step 3(c). We next define yet another family of sub-distributions {Sim
S,q S }. However, to motivate this definition, let's first try to define our honest-referee no-signaling strategy {p * q } q∈Q . We define it in a greedy manner, as follows. We start by defining
We would like to argue that Pr
S,q S = a S ]. To remedy this, we extend the sub-distribution p * q , as follows:
For each q ∈ Q, we extend the subdistribution p * q as follows: We do not change its distribution over elements in A, but we allow it to also output elements in A * that are not in A. More specifically, we extend p * q as follows: For any set S ⊆ [k] and any a S ∈ A S , we define
Equation (3) ensures that this probability is non-negative. Moreover, Equation (6) ensures that indeed Pr[p * q | S = a S ] = Pr[Sim (2) S,q S = a S ], and hence only depends on q S as desired. Unfortunately, this remedy does not work. The reason is that only initially it is true that Pr[Sim (2) S,q S = a S ] − Pr[p * q | S = a S ] ≥ 0. However, as we extend the definition of p * q , it's probability mass grows, and can cause the above term to become negative! We note that even if we extend p q carefully, by induction (as we eventually do), by starting with subsets of size [k − 1], and always defining Pr[p * q = (a S , * )] with respect to the updated version of {p * q }, this process can result with Pr[Sim
. Intuitively, the reason is that when we add elements of the form (a S , * ) to the probability mass of p q , for a given subset S ⊆ [k], this may increase Pr[p q | T = a T ] for subsets T ⊆ S, and may even increase them beyond the value of Sim (2) T,q T (a T ). To remedy this, before we define {p * q } q∈Q , we make one last adjustment to {Sim
S,q S } to ensure that we can safely define p * q as above, without reaching the negative regime.
Specifically, for every subset S ⊆ [k] and every q S ∈ Q we define the sub-distribution
We argue that if we define {p * q } q∈Q as above, with respect to {Sim
S,q S } (as opposed to {Sim (2) S,q S }) then we do not hit the negative regime. In the formal proof (in Section 5), we prove that we can take {Sim (3) S,q S } to be any family of sub-distributions that satisfies the condition that for every q ∈ Q and every S ⊆ [k],
(this is the condition needed in order to avoid the negative regime when defining {p * q } q∈Q as above), and in addition satisfies the following three requirements (which {Sim
i. For every S, T ⊆ [k] for which S ⊆ T , and for every q ∈ Q and a ∈ A,
iii. For every q ∈ GOOD,
Defining {Sim
S,q S } as in Equation (7) is one (easy) way of ensuring that these four conditions are satisfied. However, there may be an alternative way of defining {Sim (3) S,q S } in a less lossy manner.
Finally, we note that by defining {p * q } q∈Q as above, the total probability of p * q may not be exactly 1. It may be smaller than 1 or greater than 1. However, Item (3(c)ii) implies that the total probability is fixed and does not depend on q. Therefore, we can safely normalize it to be exactly 1 without damaging the honest-referee no-signaling guarantee.
We refer the reader to Section 5 for the formal proof.
Our Parameters. Recall that we convert a sub-no-signaling strategy with value at least 1−2 −dk 2 into a no-signaling strategy with value at least 2 −ck 2 (for some constants c, d > 0). We don't have any reason to believe that this loss is inherent. In particular, we would have liked to convert any sub-no-signaling strategy with value at least 1 − 2 −dk into a no-signaling strategy with value at least 2 −ck . This would imply that O(log n)-prover no-signaling MIP is in PSPACE. This loss stems mainly from two places: In Step 2, where we go from honest-referee no-signaling to no-signaling (via a transformation from [12] ), and in Step 3a, where we define Sim (1) S,q S . There is another 2 k log k loss in Step 3c, however this loss is small compared to the other two. We do not know if any of these losses are inherent, and leave it as an open problem to explore.
Preliminaries

No-Signaling Games
Definition 3.1. A k-prover, one-round game is a tuple G = (Q 1 , ..., Q k , A 1 , ..., A k , V, π), where Q 1 , ..., Q k are sets of queries, A 1 , ..., A k are sets of answers,
is a polynomial-time computable function, and π is a polynomial-time sampleable probability distribution over (Q 1 , ..., Q k ).
Notation. We denote by
.., s |S| }, and similarly for A S .
We denote by [k] = {1, . . . , k}. For every q = (q 1 , . . . , q k ) ∈ Q, every a = (a 1 . . . , a k ) ∈ A, and every S ⊆ [k], we denote by q S = (q i ) i∈S and a S = (a i ) i∈S . For any q ∈ Q, any a ∈ A, and any subset S ⊆ [k], we denote by Two relaxations of the notion of no-signaling were considered in the literature: the first is the notion of sub-no-signaling, by Lancien and Winter [21] , and the second is the notion of honest-referee no-signaling by Holmgren and Yang [12] . In both cases these relaxed notions were motivated by the goal of proving a parallel repetition theorem for no-signaling strategies. We begin by defining the latter notion. Definition 3.4. A strategy {p q } q∈Q for a k-player game G = (Q, A, V, π) is said to be honestreferee no-signaling if the no-signaling condition holds for every q ∈ Q such that Pr[π = q] > 0 (and is not required to hold for queries that are not in the support of π).
Formally, {p q } q∈Q is a honest-referee no-signaling strategy for G if there exists a family of probability distributions {Sim S,q S } S⊆[k],q S ∈Q S , where each Sim S,q S is a distribution over A S , such that for every q ∈ Q in the support of π, every S ⊆ [k], and every a S ∈ A S , p q (a S ) = Sim S,q S (a S ). Definition 3.5. A strategy {p q } q∈Q for a k-player game G = (Q, A, V, π) is said to be subno-signaling if there exists a family of probability distributions {Sim S,q S } S⊆[k],q S ∈Q S , where each Sim S,q S is a distribution over A S , such that for every q ∈ Q, every S ⊆ [k], and every a S ∈ A S , p q (a S ) ≤ Sim S,q S (a S ).
If {p q } q∈Q is a sub-no-signaling set of probability distributions, then for every q ∈ Q, if
then in the remaining probability p q outputs ⊥. Definition 3.6. Let NS(G) be the set of no-signaling strategies of a k-prover game G = (Q, A, V, π). The no-signaling value of G is
Similarly, let hrNS(G) be the set of honest-referee no-signaling strategies of G. The honest-referee no-signaling value of G is 
Linear Programming
Theorem 3.8 (Strong duality [24] ). If the value of a linear program is finite then it is equal to the value of its dual. In what follows we state our main theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Fix any language L / ∈ SPACE(poly(n, 2 k )) and any k-prover one-round proof system (P 1 , . . . , P k , V ) for L with completeness c ≥ 1 − 2 −5k 2 . For every x consider the game G x = (Q, A, V, π x ), where Q = Q 1 × . . . × Q k and where Q i is the set of possible queries sent by V to prover P i , A = A 1 ×, . . . , A k and where A i is the set of possible answers sent by P i , and π x is the distribution of queries sent by V (x).
Then, there exists a constant a > 0 and an infinite set N ⊆ N, such that for every n ∈ N there
We present two different proofs for Theorem 4.1. Both make use of the following theorem which is the main technical contribution of this work. 
We defer the proof of Theorem 4.2 to Section 5, and refer the reader to Section 2.3 for the high-level overview of the proof. In what follows we present our proofs for Theorem 4.1, both using Theorem 4.2 as a building block.
In the first proof, presented in Section 4.1, we rely on a prover reduction theorem which shows that one can convert any k-player game with no-signaling value at most 2 −O(k 2 ) into a 2-player game with no-signaling value at most 1−2 −Ω(k 2 ) . In the second proof, presented in Section 4.2, we rely on the fact that one can approximate the sub-no-signaling of a k-player game up to an additive factor ǫ, using an algorithm running in space poly(cc, 2 k , 1/ǫ), where cc is the communication complexity of the game.
From Multi-Prover No-Signaling Proofs to 2-Prover No-Signaling Proofs
In the classical setting there is a well known reduction that converts any k-player game into a 2-player. Below we present a slight variant of it, that will be useful in the no-signaling setting.
Let G = (Q, A, V, π) be a k-player game. Consider the following 2-player game, denoted by T (G) = (Q * , A * , V * , π * ):
• π * generates q ← π and generates a random subset S ⊆ [k]. It outputs (q, (S, q S )).
• V * ((q, (S, q S )), (a, a ′ S )) accepts if and only if V (q, a) accepts and a i = a ′ i for every i ∈ S. Proof. Let G be a k-player game with no-signaling value less than 2 −ck 2 . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the no-signaling value of the 2-player game T (G) is 1 − ǫ, for ǫ < 2 −5k 2 . Let {p q,(S,q S ) } be a no-signaling strategy that convinces the verifier V * in the game T (G) to accept with probability 1 − ǫ.
Consider the sub-no-signaling strategy {p q } for the k-player game G, where P q samples answers as follows:
2. If there exists S ⊆ [k] such that the above answers are rejecting (i.e., V * ((q, (S, q S )), (a, a ′ S )) = 0) then output ⊥. We prove that {p q } is sub-no-signaling with respect to {Sim S,q S }. Namely, we prove that for every q ∈ Q, every S ⊆ [k], and every a S ∈ A S ,
We note that Equation (8) would clearly hold if we chose a corresponding to the specific set S in the equation. However, recall that p q chooses a corresponding to a random subset S ′ ⊆ [k]. Thus, we define for every (fixed) S ⊆ [k] a strategy {p S q } which is identical to {p q }, except that if it doesn't abort then it always outputs a corresponding to the fixed subset S. Therefore, to conclude the proof that {p q } is sub-no-signaling it suffices to prove that for every q ∈ Q, every a ∈ A, and every subsets S, S ′ ⊆ [k], it holds that
which follows directly from the the fact that {p q,(S,q S ) } is no-signaling (together with the definition of {p S q }).
Note that the sub-no-signaling strategy {p q } is rejected with probability at most 2 k · ǫ (by the union bound).
This in particular implies that the sub-no-signaling value of G is at least
which by Theorem 4.2 implies that the no-signaling value of G is at least 2 −ck 2 , contradicting our assumption.
Approximating the Sub-No-Signaling Value of k-Player Game via a Space Efficient Algorithm
Theorem 4.5. There exists an algorithm B and a polynomial p such that for any k-player game G = (Q, A, V, π), and any ǫ > 0, it holds that B(G, ǫ) runs in space p(log(|Q, A|), 1/ǫ, 2 k ) and outputs a value v such that |v − V subNS (G)| ≤ ǫ.
Corollary 4.6. Fix any language L and any k-prover one-round proof system (P 1 , . . . , P k , V ) for L.
For every x consider the game G x = (Q, A, V, π x ), where Q = Q 1 × . . . × Q k and where Q i is the set of possible queries sent by V to prover P i , A = A 1 ×, . . . , A k where A i is the set of possible answers sent by P i , and π x is the distribution of queries sent by V (x).
Denote by c the completeness of this proof system. 6 If there exists a constant d ∈ N, such that for every large enough n ∈ N, and every
Proof of Corollary 4.6. Fix any language L and any k-prover one-round proof system (P 1 , . . . , P k , V ) for L with completeness c. For every x ∈ {0, 1} * , consider the corresponding game G x as defined in the corollary statement. Suppose that there exists a constant d ∈ N, such that for every large enough n ∈ N, and every
10·n d . From Theorem 4.5 we know that there exists an algorithm B, that given any k-prover game G = (Q, A, V, π), and any parameter ǫ, approximates the value of G up to an additive ǫ error. Importantly B is an algorithm with space complexity poly(log(|(Q, A)|), 1/ǫ, 2 k ). Given x ∈ {0, 1} * , we determine if x ∈ L by running B(G x , 1/ǫ), and if the value is at least c − ǫ then we conclude that x ∈ L, and otherwise conclude that x / ∈ L. Note that 1/ǫ is a polynomial in n since ǫ = 1 10n d . In addition, the size of Q, A is exponential in n, which implies that the space complexity of B(G x , 1/ǫ) is poly(n, 2 k ), as desired. 8 Finally, we note that there may be a finite number of n's for which we do not have the guarantee that V subNS (G x ) ≤ c − 1 n d . For these n's, we can hard-wire the answers for whether x ∈ L. We next prove Theorem 4.5. We use the approach of [14] which proves that the no-signaling value of a two-player, one-round game can be approximated in PSPACE.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Fix any game G = (A, Q, V, π). The sub-no-signaling value of G is given by the following linear program (where the variables are p q (a) and Sim S,q S (a S ), for every q ∈ Q, a ∈ A, and nonempty S ⊆ [k])
Subject to
A proof system is said to have completeness c if for every x ∈ L the honest provers convince the verifier to accept x ∈ L with probability at least c. In particular, this implies that V subNS (Gx) ≥ c for every x ∈ L. 7 This is assuming the communication complexity is poly(n). In the general case, where the communication complexity is cc, we get that L ∈ SPACE poly(n, cc, 2 k )
In what follows, we replace p q (a) with x q (a) = π(q)p q (a) to simplify the expression of the objective value. This gives us the linear program
Observe that the constraints in this linear program above imply that Sim S,q S (a S ) ≥ 0 for every S ⊆ [k], every q S ∈ Q S and every a S ∈ A S . Namely, these constraints can be added without changing the value of the linear program. This implies (by Definition 3.7), that the dual to this linear program can be written as
Observe that the constraints in this linear program imply that z S (q S ) ≥ 0 for every S ⊆ [k] and every q S ∈ Q S , and thus these constraints can be added without changing the value. Next, transform this linear program into a linear program with non-negative coefficients. To do so, observe that the optimal solution to the above linear program satisfies that y S (q, a S ) ≤ 1 for every S ⊆ [k], every q ∈ Q and every a S ∈ A S . This follows from the fact that V (a, q) ≤ 1 for every a ∈ A and every q ∈ Q. Therefore, we can replace y S (q, a S ) by y S (q, a S ) = 1 − y S (q, a S ), without changing the value of the linear program. This gives us the linear program
, ∀q S ∈ Q S (12) Note that all of the coefficients of this linear program are non-negative.
Recall that our goal is to construct a poly(log(|(Q, A)|), 1/ǫ, 2 k )-space algorithm for computing v such that |v − V subNS (G)| ≤ ǫ.
To this end, we add to our linear program a constraint of the form
(for some value v ′ ), and convert this (restricted) linear program into a mixed packing and covering program, with the guarantee that for δ = (ǫ/2) 2 k , a (1 + δ)-approximate solution to the mixed packing and covering program, implies a solution to the (restricted) linear program, which is ǫ/2-close an optimal solution. We can then use binary search to find an ǫ-approximation to the original linear program.
To turn this restricted linear program into a mixed packing and covering problem, we use all of the constraints above and include the constraint
A (1 + δ)-approximate solution to a mixed packing and covering problem is (by definition) a solution to the problem where all of the inequalities of the form a i x i ≤ c are relaxed to a i x i ≤ c(1 + δ). In our case, it means that the above ≤ inequalities are replaced with
We next argue that a (1 + δ)-approximate solution to our mixed packing and covering problem implies a solution to our (restricted) linear program with value at most v ′ + ǫ.
To this end, suppose there these exists such a solution to the mixed packing and covering problem, and denote it by
Consider the solution
It is easy to see that this solution satisfies the constraints of the (restricted) linear program, and thus is a solution to the linear program. The value of this solution is
From Theorem 3.10 we can conclude that approximating the sub-no-signaling value of a game with a constant number of provers takes space p(log(|(Q, A)|), 1/ǫ, 2 k ).
Proof of Theorem 4.1 via Corollary 4.6
In what follows we prove Theorem 4.1. In the proof we rely on Corollary 4.6 which implies that if L / ∈ SPACE(n, 2 k ) then there is an infinite set N ⊆ N such that for every n ∈ N there is an element
n . Consider the infinite set N 0 ⊆ N such that for every n ∈ N 0 it holds that n ≥ 2 5k 2 . We conclude that for every n ∈ N 0 there exists
Therefore, to prove Theorem 4.1 it suffices to prove the following theorem. The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.2.
We refer the reader to Section 2.3 for a high-level overview of the proof of Theorem 4.2.
The Proof of Theorem 4.2
In this section we prove Theorem 4.2, which is our main technical theorem. In the proof, we use the following theorem from [12] . Consider the distribution π * = π|(q ∈ GOOD), and let G * = (Q, A, V, π * ). Note that G * is a game with sub-no-signaling value at least 1 − 2ǫ, since {p q } is a sub-no-signaling strategy for G * that succeeds with probability at least 1 − 2ǫ.
We next define a sub-no-signaling strategy {p q } for the game G * , such that for every q ∈ GOOD, every S ⊆ [k], and every a S ∈ A S , it holds that
and for every q ∈ GOOD, Pr
To this end, we definep q in a greedy manner, so that Equation (13) holds, while keeping the invariant that for every q ∈ GOOD and a ∈ A it holds thatp q (a) ≤ p q (a). This is done as follows: Fix any q ∈ GOOD. Start withp q = p q . For every S ⊆ [k] and every a S , if
] then (arbitrarily) reducep q (a * ) for every a * ∈ A such that a * S = a S so that
, and in the remaining probability output ⊥. For each S and a S , this step reduces the probability that V accepts by at most
}. This follows from the invariant that for every a it holds thatp q (a) ≤ p q (a). Since we do this for every S ⊆ [k] and every a S , in total the probability that V accepts is reduced by at most
Note that Equation (13) holds by definition of {p q }. To prove Equation (14), it suffices to prove the following claim. Therefore,
We thus conclude that a S δ S,a S (q) ≤ 2ǫ, which in turn implies that δ(q) = S,a S δ S,a S (q) ≤ 2 k+1 ǫ, as desired.
Thus, the strategy {p q } satisfies Equations (13) and (14) .
We next define a family of sub-distributions 9 {Sim
S,q S is a sub-distribution over A S , such that for every S, T ⊆ [k] such that S ⊂ T , and every q ∈ Q and a ∈ A,
Pr[Sim
and for every q ∈ GOOD,
We start by defining {Sim ′ S,q S } by
Note that this is a sub-distribution since by Equation (13),
which together with the linearity of expectation, implies that indeed
Moreover, Equation (14), together with the definition of {Sim ′ S,q S }, implies that for every q ∈ GOOD, Pr
We next define {Sim (1) S,q S } by modifying {Sim ′ S,q S } in a greedy manner, to ensure that Equation (15) is satisfied. This is done by induction starting with sets of size 1. For every set T of size 1, and for every q T , define Sim
Suppose we defined Sim (1) S,q S for all sets S of size less than i. We next define Sim (1) T,q T for sets T of size i. To this end, fix any T of size i and fix any q T . Start by setting Sim (1) T,q T = Sim ′ T,q T .
For every S ⊂ T and for every a S , if Pr[Sim (1) T,q T | S = a S ] > Pr[Sim (1) S,q S = a S ] then (arbitrarily) reduce the total probability of Sim (1) T,q T by exactly
S,q S = a S ], so that Pr[Sim (1) T,q T | S = a S ] = Pr[Sim (1) S,q S = a S ] Clearly this ensures that Equation (15) holds. We next argue that despite this reduction in probability, Equation Note that Claim 5.4, together with Equation (17), implies that for every q ∈ GOOD,
thus establishing Equation (16), as desired.
Proof of Claim 5.4. Fix any T ⊆ [k] and any q ∈ Q. Note that for every S ⊂ T and for every a S ∈ A S ,
By the definition of Sim ′ S,q S , Sim
S,q S , andp q , it holds that
S,q S = a S ].
Therefore, the equations above imply that
which in turn implies that
Note that by definition a S
Therefore
where the second inequality follows from Equation (17). This implies that
We use Equation (20), to prove that for every T ⊆ [k] and for every q T ,
We prove Equation (21) by induction on the size of T , starting from |T | = 1. For every T of size 1 and for every q T , by definition ξ(T, q T ) = 0. Suppose Equation (21) holds for every T of size less than i, we prove that it holds for T of size i as follows:
as desired, where the first inequality follows from Equation (20), the second inequality follows from the induction hypothesis, and the other inequalities follow from basic arithmetic.
We next modify Sim (1) S,q S to ensure that its total probability is independent of q S . More specifically, we define Sim (2) S,q S , which is a modification of Sim 
In addition, we still ensure that for every S, T ⊆ [k] such that S ⊂ T , and for every q ∈ Q and a ∈ A, Pr[Sim (2) T,q T | S = a S ] ≤ Pr[Sim
To this end, for every S ⊆ [k] and every q S ∈ Q S let
We argue that for every S ⊆ [k],
10 Note that by our assumption that ǫ < 2 −4k 2 , Equation (24) implies that for every q ∈ GOOD,
as follows:
where the first equation follows from Equation (19) together with the definition of Sim ′ S,q S , the second equation follows from Claim 5.4, the third equation holds for every q * such that q * S = q S , the forth equation follows from Equation (14), and the last equation follows from basic arithmetic.
For every ℓ ∈ [k], let
For every S ⊆ [k] of size ℓ, and for every q S ∈ Q S and a S ∈ A S , define
Note that by definition a S Pr[Sim (2) S,q S = a S ] = α ℓ , as desired. Moreover, Sim
S,q S is a sub-distribution, since Pr[Sim (2) S,q S = a S ] = Pr[Sim
where the first equality follows from the definition of Sim (2) S,q S and the last inequality follows from Equation (25) together with the the definition of α ℓ .
We next argue that Sim (2) S,q S satisfies Equation (23) . To this end, fix any S ⊂ T ⊆ [k] and fix any q ∈ Q and a ∈ A. Note that Finally, note that for every q ∈ GOOD, Pr a←Sim (2) [k],q [V (q, a) = 1] = Pr
as desired, where the first equation follows from the definition of Sim (2) [k],q , the second equation follows from the fact that β q ≤ 1, and the last inequality follows from Equation (16) and from the definition of α k . We next modify {Sim (2) S,q S } to a new family of sub-distributions {Sim (3) S,q S } that satisfies that for every q ∈ Q and every S ⊆ [k],
To this end, we define
Proof. Fix any q ∈ Q and any subset S ⊆ [k]. Note that
S,q S = a S ] as desired, where the first equation follows from basic arithmetic, the second equation follows from the definition of Sim
T,q T , the third equation follows from Equation (23), the forth and fifth equations follow from basic arithmetic, the six follows from the definition of Sim (3) T,q T , and the last equation follows from the fact that
Equation (24), together with the definition of {Sim
S,q S } and the assumption that ǫ ≤ 2 −4k 2 , implies that for every q ∈ GOOD, Pr a←Sim (3) [k],q [V (q, a) = 1] ≥ 2 −3k log k .
Equation (23), together with the definition of {Sim
S,q S }, implies that for every S, T ⊆ [k] such that S T , and every q ∈ Q and a ∈ A, In what follows, we define an honest-referee no-signaling strategy for the game G * that convinces V to accept with probability at least 2 −3k log k . By Theorem 5.1 this implies that V NS (G * ) ≥ 2 −O(k 2 ) · 2 −3k log k = 2 −O(k 2 ) .
By the definition of G * (and by Claim 5.2), this implies that
as desired. Therefore, it suffices to define an honest-referee no-signaling strategy for the game G * that convinces V to accept with probability at least 2 −3k log k . We do this in stages.
First, we define a strategy {p Equation (26) implies that this value is non-negative. Moreover, note that for every a ∈ A,
[k],q = a].
We next ensure that p (1) q is a distribution. To this end, note that 
T,q T | S = a S ] = a T ∈A T Pr[Sim
T,q T = a T ] depends only on T , and is otherwise independent of q T . This follows from Equation (22) and from the definition of Sim If α > 1 then we convert p (1) q to a distribution p If α < 1 then we convert p (1) q to a distribution p It is easy to see that in either case, p
q is a distribution.
Claim 5.6. {p (2) q } satisfies the honest referee no-signaling condition.
Proof. In what follows, we use the following notation: If p
q satisfies α = a * ∈A * Pr[p (1) q = a] > 1 then let γ = 1 α , and otherwise let γ = 1. Fix any subset S ⊆ [k]. We argue that for every q, q * ∈ GOOD such that q S = q * S , and for every a S ∈ A * S , Pr[p (2) q | S = a S ] = Pr[p (2) q * | S = a S ]. Define S ′ ⊆ S to be the subset for which for every i ∈ S ′ it holds that a i ∈ A, and for every i ∈ S \ S ′ it holds that a i = * . 
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Thomas Vidick and Lisa Yang for numerous illuminating and fruitful discussions. Dhiraj Holden was supported by NSF MACS -CNS-1413920.
